Essays on Trade Credit by Ee, Benjamin
  
 
Essays on Trade Credit 
by 
Benjamin Ee 
Business Administration 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
John Graham, Co-Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Manju Puri, Co-Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Alon Brav 
 
___________________________ 
David Robinson 
 
___________________________ 
Sharon Belezon 
 
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in Business Administration  
 in the Graduate School 
of Duke University 
 
2013 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
Essays on Trade Credit 
by 
Benjamin Ee 
Business Administration 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
John Graham, Co-Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Manju Puri, Co-Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Alon Brav 
 
___________________________ 
David Robinson 
 
___________________________ 
Sharon Belezon 
 
An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in Business Administration 
in the Graduate School 
of Duke University 
 
2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Benjamin Ee 
2013 
 
  
iv
Abstract 
This dissertation investigates how variation in trade credit standards play a role 
in firm maturation.  In Chapter 1, I survey existing research in trade credit.  Following 
this, I identify lifecycle trends in supplier trade credit policy in Chapter 2.  Young 
suppliers assume greater risks in trade credit provision early in their lifecycles in order 
to advance growth and product market agendas. There is a peak around a supplier’s 
IPO in the riskiness of trade credit supplied, measured by doubtful receivables and the 
length of credit provided (receivables length).  I find that young firms in industries 
where customer-supplier relationships are more significant have higher doubtful 
receivables, consistent with suppliers varying trade credit standards to build 
relationships.  Additionally, young suppliers with more complex products (as measured 
by R&D intensity) offer longer duration loans compared to suppliers of similar age.  
Offering riskier trade credit terms affects economic outcomes.  In Chapter 3, I study if 
varying trade credit standards for the purpose of relationship building is a viable 
strategy for all firm maturities.  I use the incidence of a major free trade agreement to 
study firm responses to a major disruption in existing supplier-customer relationships.  
Chapter 3 posits both supplier driven as well as customer driven explanations for the 
observed responses, finding evidence consistent with older suppliers have a reduced 
incentive as well as capacity to engage in relationship building. 
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1. Existing Research in Trade Credit  
Trade credit is an important source of finance.  Lee & Stowe ’93 found that the 
amount of trade credit in 1985 “far exceeded the business lending of the entire banking 
system”.  Rajan and Zingales ’95 find that payables amounted to 18% of assets for U.S. 
firms in 1991; additionally, in countries such as Germany, France and Italy, trade credit 
exceeded a quarter of corporate assets.  Ng, Smith & Smith ’99 find that during the 
1990s, vendor financing accounted “for an average US$1.5 trillion of book value of U.S. 
corporations, and represented approximately 2.5 times the combined value of all new 
public debt and primary equity issues during a given year”.  Notwithstanding, 
industrial firms supply these significant amounts of credit in the presence of a financial 
sector that specializes in providing capital.  Why are industrial firms able to supply 
these large amounts of financing, why do they do it, why do customers consume trade 
credit when bank credit is available, and what are the outcomes of trade credit supply?   
This chapter surveys existing research in trade credit that address some of these 
questions.  Section 1.1 introduces common trade credit contractual terms, while Section 
1.2 describes research that seek to explain the existence of trade credit by examining why 
industrial firms may have an advantage over financial institutions in financing their 
customers.  Section 1.3 examines trade credit from the customer’s perspective – how 
does being able to access financing via trade credit benefit customers?  Next, Section 1.4 
provides an overview of theories and empirical research on why suppliers provide trade 
 2 
credit, and what they may gain from doing so.  Lastly, Section 1.5 focuses on research 
that determines the outcomes of trade credit policy, concentrating heavily on the 
macroeconomic implications of trade credit supply.   
1.1 Trade Credit Definition and Typical Contractual Terms 
Trade credit is extended by the suppliers of industrial inputs, goods or services 
to their customers, and allows for a delay in payment for the aforementioned.  The 
accounting treatment of trade credit on the supplier end is to enter outstanding unpaid 
trade credit extended into accounts receivables.  Similarly, outstanding trade credit debt 
on the customer end is entered into accounts payables. 
 Typical trade credit terms involve either a simple, or two part contract (Smith 
’87).  Both simple and two part contractual terms will quote a due date, which is the 
maximal date that payment must be made by.  Second, two part contracts will also quote 
a discount date, as well as discount amount; customers who pay on or before the 
discount date will receive the discount amount.   
For instance, retail firms may quote trade credit terms as “2-10 net 30” (Smith 
’87).  This means customers receive a 2% discount if their bill is paid within 10 days, 
while the full amount is due in 30 days.  Hence, if the customer is unable to pay by day 
10, but pays instead on day 30, it is borrowing from day 10 to day 30 at an effective 
annual interest rate of 43.5%.   
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1.1.1 Common Trade Credit Terms 
This section details research that study how and why trade credit contract terms 
vary; for instance, what is the typical contract period of trade credit?  Who receives 
longer net days, and are offered payment discounts?  Research in this section therefore 
relate observed contractual features to buyer and supplier characteristics. 
Using survey data, Ng, Smith & Smith ’87 find that, by far, the most common simple net 
terms for U.S. industrial firms are “net 30”, while the most common two-part terms is 
“2/10 net 30”.  Some industries do not generally offer two part terms, and these are 
mining, perishable food products, fabrics, apparel, furniture, inorganic chemicals, 
diagnostic products, chemical products, industrial equipment and electronic 
components.  By contrast, industries which offer two-part terms are  non-perishable 
food products, women’s outerwear (exception to the apparel industry mentioned 
previously), lumber and wood products, pharmaceuticals, petroleum refining, rubber 
and plastic products, stone, clay and glass products, blast furnances and steel, iron and 
steel foundries, fabricated metal, industrial machinery, electrical industrial apparatus, 
and transportation (see Table 2, Ng, Smith & Smith ’97).  The authors also find that 
around 30% of their respondents had customers who always or frequently pay in the 
next period, and thus, rely on trade credit for routine financing.  Interestingly, a majority 
(72.4%) of their survey respondents indicated a willingness to accept discounted 
payments during the net period, but after the discount period, and that this willingness 
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is higher when the buyer has a long-standing relationship.  In addition, around half of 
their respondents indicated that the use of trade credit did not imply to them that their 
customers were unable to obtain alternative financing, while most of the other half 
(50.6%) responded that “using the trade-credit financing does indicate, at least 
occasionally, that the customer is facing financial difficulty”.  
Klapper, Laeven & Rajan ’11 survey approximately 30,000 trade credit contracts to 
describe important contractual terms such as duration, and discounts, as well as the 
characteristics of contracting parties.  Customers in their dataset are predominantly 
large firms (with around 59% of customers having over US$10 billion in sales, and 
around 75% being investment grade), so the financing motive for trade credit extension 
is likely to be less operative for this sample.  This is especially since, relative to buyers, 
suppliers in their dataset are small; 56% of suppliers have less than US$100 million in 
sales, with almost two-thirds having a credit rating below investment grade.  Contracts 
in their sample are generally long in duration, averaging 59.2 days (median of 60 days), 
where 75% of the contracts have net days longer than 30 days, which Ng, Smith and 
Smith ’99 show to be the typical trade credit contract length.  13% of contracts in their 
sample offer early payment discounts, and two-thirds of discount days are 30 days or 
less, with 27% between 30 to 60 days.  Klapper, Laeven & Rajan ’11 also find that some 
terms appear to be very common, with 20% of discount days being 10 days, 20% being 
30 days, and 16% being 60 days.  The most typical difference between net and discount 
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days in their sample were either 1 day (34% of contracts with discounts), 30 days (29%) 
and 20 days (16%).  Average effective interest rate on forgoing offered discounts, and 
paying on the maximal due date, was 53% in their sample, ranging from a low of 2% to a 
high of 100%.  In general, they find that creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the 
longest maturities from smaller suppliers, perhaps as a means of certifying product 
quality.  Moreover, early payment discounts are offered to riskier buyers, possibly as a 
way to reduce the probability of nonpayment. 
1.2 Supplier Advantage in Providing Financing 
Why do suppliers provide credit when customers may also obtain credit from a 
financial sector that already specializes in the provision of capital?  Suppliers may enjoy 
an advantage over financial institutions in providing financing for the following reasons: 
  
1.2.1 Informational Advantages 
 Industrial suppliers may know more about their customers compared to financial 
institutions.  This may be due to the frequency of interactions between suppliers and 
customers, and the fact that suppliers obtain information about borrowers in the typical 
course of business (Emery ’87, Biais & Gollier ’97, Petersen & Rajan ’97, Jain ’01 and 
others), as well as the ability of suppliers to understand the customer industry better due 
to being proximate in a closely related industry.  Miwa & Ramseyer ’05 argues that 
“bankers seldom know their borrowers’ industries first-hand, they rely on guarantees 
and security interests while trade partners know those industries well, they instead 
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monitor their borrowers closely”.  In addition, the typical two part structure of trade 
credit contracts itself may allow suppliers to obtain information about the customers.  
Customers who decline to accept a trade credit discount via early payment may 
therefore signal financial difficulties to the supplier.  
1.2.2 Ease of Enforcement  
Kiyotaki & Moore ’97 and Albuquerque & Hopenhayn ’04 propose models 
where the sole means of enforcement for debt contracts is an external threat; Bolton & 
Scharfstein ’90 suggest that the possibility of lenders withholding additional financing is 
what compels borrowers to repay debts.  Customers who consume production inputs 
that are supplied on credit may not possess many viable alternatives for obtaining these 
inputs.  Hence, suppliers may credibly wield the threat of withholding future shipments 
of inputs as a means of compelling repayment to previous trade credit loans (Petersen & 
Rajan ’97, Cunat ’07).  Sunk costs, such as relationship specific investments, learning-by-
doing processes, etc incur costly switching on the customer.  This compares with 
financial institutions who generally supply finance that customers may be able to readily 
find alternatives for.  Additionally, bankruptcy laws may constrain the ability of 
financial institutions to cut off additional supply of funds, while suppliers can take 
added precautions such as making sales on consignment (Petersen & Rajan ’97).  
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1.2.3 Non Divertibility of Trade Inputs Compared to Cash 
One weakness of explanations based on supplier informational or enforcement 
advantages is their failure to explain why suppliers do not lend more cash to customers 
than the value of the trade input provided, if suppliers have an advantage over financial 
institutions in both information and enforcement (Burkart & Ellingsen ’04). 
However, one feature of trade credit that lowers monitoring costs for suppliers 
versus financial institutions is that cash is readily diverted, while inputs less so.  
Therefore, the illiquidity of inputs facilitates trade credit (Burkart & Ellingsen ’04).  This 
theory is consistent with the finding in Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic ’02 as well as 
Fisman and Love ’03 that firms in countries with weaker legal systems rely more on 
trade credit.   
Empirically, Giannetti, Burkart & Ellingsen ’11 find that suppliers of 
differentiated products and services have larger accounts receivable than suppliers of 
standardized goods; additionally, customers of services receive cheaper trade credit for 
longer periods.  This has two interpretations.  First, differentiated products and services 
are more difficult, or even impossible (in the case of services) to divert for unintended 
purposes.  Standardized products may be easily resold, but resale revenues for 
differentiated goods may be low because it is difficult to identify suitable buyers.  
However, a second interpretation of these results is that suppliers of differentiated 
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products are difficult to replace because they provide unique inputs, making buyers 
reluctant to break up relationships.  
1.2.4 Ease of Reselling Collateral 
Production inputs may be repossessed if customers default on trade credit 
payments.  The value of these inputs as collateral will increase with their durability 
(Mian & Smith ’92), and decrease with the amount of processing or transformation by 
the customer (Petersen & Rajan ’97).  Overall, trade suppliers can redeploy inputs more 
efficiently than other lenders after repossessing because they have existing relationships 
with the pool of potential alternative buyers, and also because they can modify the 
goods more easily to the needs of other customers.  This also predicts that more 
differentiated goods should be sold on credit (Longhofer & Santos ’03, Frank & 
Maksimovic ’98), because differentiated goods are often more customized to the needs of 
specific customers.  Frank and Maksimovic ’04 also argue that under the common law 
legal system in particular, trade creditors are able to repossess collateral more easily 
than financial intermediaries.  Empirically, this theory is unable to fully account for the 
widespread use of trade credit in the United States (among other countries).  This is 
because suppliers have a limited ability to repossess the good in the U.S. (Giannetti, 
Burkart & Ellingsen ’08).  U.S. laws only allow suppliers to repossess the good within 10 
days of delivery, unless a lien has been established – this is both costly, infrequent, as 
well as impossible if the production process will transform the good.  In addition, this 
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theory is unable to explain why services, which have no collateral value, are provided 
on credit. 
1.3 Trade Credit, Customer Incentives and Outcomes 
Customers may substitute trade credit for financial credit, thereby alleviating 
financial constraints.  Meltzer ‘60’s “substitution hypothesis” proposes that trade credit 
is used as a backstop to traditional credit markets, and large suppliers finance their 
customers by providing more working capital during credit crunches.  Schwartz ’97 and 
Petersen & Rajan ’97 find that firms use more trade credit when credit from financial 
institutions is unavailable.  Focusing on the 1988 - 1989 National Survey of Small 
Business Finance (NSSBF), Petersen & Rajan ‘97 find that firms with suspect credit 
quality are able to obtain financing from suppliers (the reasons for this are discussed in 
Section 1.2).   
The primary dataset in Petersen & Rajan ’97, the NSSBF, is suited to the study of 
small, financially constrained firms because of its focus.  Specifically, NSSBF targets 
mainly nonfinancial, nonfarm small businesses that were operating as of December 1987. 
Total sample size is 3,404 firms, of which 1,875 are corporations and 1,529 are 
partnerships or sole proprietorships.  Firms are small.  Median firm has a book value of 
$130,000, and annual sales of $300,000.  Nearly 90% are owner managed.  28% of their 
sample is in the service industry, where average firm size is the smallest.  Another 27% 
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is in the retail industry, while the largest firms in their sample in terms of total assets are 
in manufacturing.   
Importantly, for the study of trade credit and credit constraints, the NSSBF data 
contains information about the current financing status of the firm, as well as its history 
of interactions with banks.  This includes length of relationships with banks, and 
whether the firm applied for, and was turned down for a loan within the last year.  
Because firms report all current obligations, it is also possible to tell if they have a 
mortgage, interest rate on most recent loan, and unused portion of credit line.   
The authors find that credit constrained firms (defined as small firms, and those 
without long-term banking relationships or located in metropolitan areas) both extend 
less trade credit to their customers, as well as consume more trade credit from suppliers.  
Since the existence of long-term banking relationships is regarded as one measure of 
financial constraints in the literature (Diamond ’89, Petersen & Rajan ’94), this suggests a 
positive relationship between trade credit consumption and financial constraints.   
Petersen & Rajan ’97 also find that demand for trade credit is positively related to 
financial constraints by distinguishing the effect of supply and demand on observed 
accounts receivables.  They do this by exploiting information on both level of accounts 
payable, and also the fraction of the firm’s annual purchases that are made on account.  
Because it is incentive compatible for all firms to at least delay payment during the 
discount period (equivalent to taking an interest free loan), the latter statistic proxies for 
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the trade credit supply curve, or “the amount of credit that is voluntarily offered” to 
these firms by their suppliers.  The authors therefore estimate demand for trade credit in 
two steps.  First, they estimate fraction of goods offered on credit based on its 
characteristics.  These estimates are used in a second stage to predict the supply of trade 
credit to the firm, and demand for trade credit is estimated while controlling for 
predicted supply.   
Due to data limitations, Petersen & Rajan ’97 only estimate trade credit supply in 
the aforementioned first stage based on customer characteristics.  However, observed 
supply is likely dependent on supplier characteristics and financial constraints as well.  
It is conceivable that common macroeconomic shocks (such as a monetary contraction) 
may shift the supply curve inwards and the demand curve outwards simultaneously, 
resulting in little change to equilibrium trade credit.  If the supply curve estimated in 
Petersen & Rajan ’97 first stage does not shift due to supply side constraints, while 
customer characteristics are sensitive to the monetary contraction, the second stage 
estimation may underestimate the effect of customer characteristics.  Nevertheless, data 
on both supplier and customer characteristics are required to overcome this limitation. 
1.3.1 Trade Credit and Bank Credit 
Petersen & Rajan ’97 also find no evidence that suppliers rely on customer prior 
relationship with a financial institution in their trade credit decision (as a signal of 
customer credit quality); even whether a firm borrows from a bank at all appeared to 
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have no effect on the trade credit decision.  The authors use the length of a firm’s longest 
relationship with a financial institution to measure the amount of information that 
financial lenders may have accumulated about the firm.  They test to see if suppliers rely 
on signaling based on prior relationships in their own decision to offer credit.  The 
hypothesis is that if this is true, trade credit offered should increase with the prior length 
of relationships with financial institution.  Conversely, if suppliers generate their own 
information, measures of prior relationship with financial institutions should be 
irrelevant.  The authors find that relationship length has an economically and 
statistically insignificant effect on trade credit provision.  Notwithstanding, one question 
is, how easily observable to potential trade creditors is borrower / customer prior 
relationship length with financial institutions, or even whether a firm borrows from a 
bank at all.  A second, technical point, is that statistical insignificance is not a good 
indicator of a lack of relationship in this context, because the interpretation of t-statistics 
by the authors is biased towards minimizing type 1 errors; correspondingly, the bar for 
type 2 errors is drastically lowered. 
Staying on the question of whether suppliers rely on customers’ prior banking 
relationships as a signal, related research suggest the opposite.  For instance, Biais & 
Gollier ’97 build a model with the following results:  firms which are not credit rationed 
do not use trade credit, while firms which are rationed due to information asymmetry 
use trade credit because suppliers are better informed than banks.  Their model is 
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consistent with the following stylized facts: firms without banking relationships rely 
more on trade credit, sellers with greater ability to generate cash flows provide more 
trade credit, and that small firms react to monetary contractions by using trade credit.  
Another interesting empirical regularity explained by the Biais & Gollier ’97 model is 
this: why do firms simultaneously borrow from both banks and trade suppliers, with the 
latter charging a much higher interest rate (see Section 1.1)?  In their model, information 
generated by trade financing conveys information from the seller to the bank, which 
then makes the bank loan possible.  Apart from suppliers being better informed than 
banks, Biais & Gollier ‘97’s model also rests on the assumption that banks and trade 
creditors are able to enforce each others’ actions at low cost by making offers contingent 
on the other’s actions.  For instance, the trade creditor is able to extend trade financing 
for part of the project contingent on bank financing being received to finance the 
remainder.  Some bank financing is required because the interest rate on trade credit is 
too high for the buyer to rely on trade financing only; the project will not be positive 
NPV using pure trade financing.  The higher interest rate on trade credit, in this model, 
is exogenous, due to higher monitoring costs incurred by trade creditors relative to the 
bank.  One question therefore is, how enforceable (in practice) is the model assumption 
that trade creditors can extend credit contingent on subsequent receipt of a bank loan by 
the borrower.   
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This is supported by Giannetti, Burkart & Ellingsen ’11 empirical finding that 
firms receiving trade credit are able to secure financing from relatively uninformed 
banks.  In particular, they “tend to borrow from a larger number of banks, utilize more 
distant banks, and have shorter relationships with their banks.  Additionally, these firms 
are offered better deals from banks, in particular lower fees for their credit lines”.  The 
authors examine the relationship between bank relationships and trade credit usage by 
estimating contemporaneous banking relationship outcomes against trade credit usage 
in Table 2 Panels C and D of their paper.  One concern is endogeneity; the possibility 
that trade creditors are conditioning credit supply on observed number of banking 
relationships or borrower-bank distance exist.  The information flow in this framework 
may therefore be from banking relationships to trade creditors.   
1.3.2 Trade Credit and Financial Crises 
Closely related research suggests that trade credit may be able to, at least 
temporarily sustain firms that are otherwise financially constrained during a time of 
crisis.  Credit channel theories of monetary policy believe that the supply of credit play 
an important role in the propagation of monetary shocks (Bernanke & Gertler ’95).  
Nilsen ’05 finds that during monetary contractions, small firms increase their use of 
trade credit to substitute for loans; additionally, large firms without bond ratings also 
increase their use of trade credit.   
 15 
Using results from a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies around 
financial crises, Love, Preve & Sarria-Allende ’07 find results consistent with the 
“redistribution view” of trade credit provision; i.e. trade credit is a channel that 
redistributes bank credit from financially strong firms to those that are financially 
weaker; specifically, their results suggest that a bank credit crunch is followed by a trade 
credit reduction.  The authors study the impact of the 1994 Peso devaluation on Mexican 
firms, as well as the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on Indonesian, South 
Korean, Malaysian, Filipino and Thai firms.  They find that total trade credit volume 
(supplied and received) by sample firms increase immediately after the crisis.  However, 
trade credit provided (not received) collapses post crisis, and “continues to contract for 
several years thereafter”.  In order to distinguish supply side causes from demand side 
explanations for this observation, the authors follow a methodology of studying firms’ 
heterogeneous responses to the crises.  In particular, they examine trade credit supply 
conditional on firm’s financial health.  If the reduction in equilibrium receivables is 
higher for firms with weaker financial conditions, this would imply a supply side driven 
effect.  The authors find that this is the case.  Nonetheless, reverse causation, or customer 
driven effects remain a concern.  One possibility is that both suppliers’ financial health 
as well as outstanding receivables fall due to a third factor, which is customer demand.  
Lower customer demand may reduce outstanding receivables, as well as impact 
supplier financial health.  While the authors normalize outstanding receivables by total 
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revenues, this ratio may still fall if it is precisely financially constrained customers (who 
are more likely to stretch payments) who stop buying.  The corresponding decrease in 
sales will then affect supplier finances.  One avenue to address this objection is to 
instrument for trade credit demand separately.   
The “redistribution view” is also consistent with Emery ’87, who proposes a 
model showing that if borrowing and lending rates, as well as storage costs that are 
faced by suppliers and customers differ, trade credit may serve to arbitrage the 
difference.  In particular, if the supplier can borrow more cheaply than the buyer, but 
also does not have an advantage in “incurring the operating cost of accommodating 
variable demand” (such as inventory storage), then optimal specialization implies that 
the supplier should provide financing, while the buyer should provide storage for the 
goods (i.e. goods should be transferred physically to buyer, but payment is delayed).  
Nonetheless, the empirical validity of this pattern of advantage between supplier and 
buyer remains to be established.  In particular, it is possible that an omitted factor, such 
as firm size, may positively result in both lower financing costs, as well as lower per unit 
storage costs due to scale economies.   
1.3.3 Trade Credit Use and Financial System Development 
Trade credit may also substitute for financial credit in countries with less 
developed financial systems.  Ge & Qiu ’06 argue that non-state owned firms in China 
receive limited support from banks.  They find that, compared to state owned firms, 
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non-state owned firms use more trade credit, and that this is for financial rather than 
transactional purposes; this is consistent with firms supporting growth via implicit 
contractual mechanisms such as trade credit in the presence of poorly developed formal 
financial sectors.  Their results support findings in McMillan & Woodruff ’99, which 
examines relational contracting in Vietnam’s emerging private sector, and find that both 
trading relationship length as well as network membership are positively associated 
with trade credit provision.  They argue that, in the absence of a well-developed legal 
system, network member is significant because network effects are used to sanction 
defaulting customers.  Fisman & Love ’03 also find that industries with higher 
dependence on trade credit financing exhibit higher rates of growth in countries with 
weaker financial institutions.   
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic ’07 suggest that trade credit provision is 
complementary to the development of financial intermediaries.  They use firm-level data 
for 39 countries, and find that firms in countries with larger and privately owned 
banking systems both offer more financing, as well as consume more financing.  
However, there is also less reliance on trade credit relative to bank credit when the 
country’s legal system is efficient.  They suggest that this happens because the 
comparative advantage of non-financial firms as intermediaries is likely smaller under 
such legal systems.  
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1.3.4 Transaction Cost Theories 
Customers may also wish to consume trade credit for non-financial reasons.  
Transaction cost theories suggest that trade credit may reduce the transaction costs of 
paying bills (Ferris ’81); customers may do so by cumulating bills and paying 
periodically.  This incentive also applies on the supplier end.  An additional incentive 
may be inventory management, where suppliers who wish to reduce warehousing costs 
vary trade credit policies to take advantage of customers’ potentially superior ability to 
carry inventory.   
In the Ferris ’81 model, uncertain delivery timings results in stochastic money 
flows in the absence of trade credit.  This results in money being held in reserve, at the 
cost of forgone interest.  This in turn provides both trading partners with an incentive to 
reduce or eliminate money holding cost.  Trade credit permits this by separating the 
exchange of goods from the immediate use of money, transforming the stochastic money 
stream into a more predictable sequence. 
Banerjee, Dasgupta & Kim ’04 also find empirical evidence of transactions 
motives in their sample of supplier firms’ principal customers from the Compustat 
Business Information File.  This conclusion derives from a non-linear relationship in 
their data between supplier firms’ receivables length and the proportion of sales 
accounted for by principal customers.  The relationship is non-monotonic.  In their data, 
trade credit initially increases with the proportion of sales to principal customers, before 
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sharply decreasing at higher levels.  This suggests opposing effects of increasing sales to 
principal customers.  The authors suggest that the initial positive relationship is because 
as the proportion of sales to principal customers increase, more frequent transactions 
occur, which encourages the use of trade credit for the reasons cited in Ferris ’81 above.  
However, because it is costly to increase transaction frequency between a point, parties 
may want to economize on the number of transactions as sales to principal customers 
increase further.  This will result in a net decrease in receivables length as the overall 
customer pool is occupied by higher quality customers who pay faster (assuming that 
principal customers are higher quality).   
Notwithstanding, focusing on the initial positive relationship, an increasing 
proportion of sales to principal customers may not necessarily result in an overall longer 
receivables length.  As number of transactions increase, if the supplier were to maintain 
similar receivables length for each transaction, then average receivables length should 
remain constant.  As the number of payment transactions would still remain constant in 
this case regardless of number of product transactions, it is unclear what incentive the 
supplier has to increase average duration based on transactions cost.  This predicts an 
initial positive relationship between gross receivables and transaction frequency, but not 
necessarily between revenue normalized receivables and transaction frequency (which is 
the dependent variable in Table 2 of Banerjee, Dasgupta & Kim ’04). 
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1.4 Supplier Incentives 
This section surveys work that examines how suppliers benefit from providing 
trade credit.   
1.4.1 Relationship Building 
Suppliers have an implicit equity stake in their customers (Petersen & Rajan ’97).  
The authors find that suppliers offer credit to “the most profitable and the most 
unprofitable firms”, when they estimate firms’ purchases on account (normalized by 
assets) against firms’ net profitability.  Moreover, this is focused on firms with negative 
profits but positive sales growth.  Petersen & Rajan ‘97 find that “growing firms who are 
losing money get more credit the lower their profits”, and suggest that by lending to 
these high-risk firms, suppliers can “invest in the future viability and profitability of 
their customers”.  One question raised by these conclusions is, how do suppliers ensure 
that they profit from their “investment”?  The mechanism by which suppliers enforce 
their implicit equity stake in risky customers remains, to the best of my knowledge, an 
open question.  
Nadiri ’69 likens trade credit to advertising, where “trade credit is a capital 
investment that, by establishing permanent relations between lender and borrower, 
gives returns over time”.  Suppliers may therefore extend trade credit to interact with 
potential customers, gaining relationship specific information in the process that enables 
them to win new long term customers.   
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Wilner ’00 posits that long-term supplier-customer relationships induce 
dependent suppliers to grant more concessions in debt renegotiations.  This in turn 
implies that customers prefer trade credit to bank credit, at a higher interest rate for 
trade credit.  Banerjee, Dasgupta & Kim ’04 examine how the trade credit policies of 
suppliers vary in the presence of principal customers.  They find that receivables 
duration decreases when principal customers exist (defined as customers that account 
for more than 10% of supplier sales), and that long term customers pay more promptly 
when suppliers are in distress, suggesting the value of durable relationships.     
Banerjee, Dasgupta & Kim ‘04’s results also do not support conjectures related to 
the hold up effect in supplier-customer relationships.  If customers exploited their 
relationships with suppliers to extract concessions via trade credit, this effect should be 
pronounced in the case of principal customers.  Since principal customers (by definition) 
account for at least 10% of supplier revenues, the supplier will be more dependent.  
Hence, if customer hold up of dependent suppliers were a significant effect, receivables 
duration should increase when principal customers exist.  As discussed above, the 
authors find the opposite.  One interesting question is what mechanism prevents 
customers from acting in this fashion, given that extracting trade credit has positive 
value.   
Related research suggest that trade creditors may act as relationship lenders, 
consistent with Petersen & Rajan ‘97’s view that suppliers have an implicit stake in their 
 22 
customers.  Cunat ’07 posits that suppliers may act as lenders of last resort, providing 
insurance against liquidity shocks that may endanger the survival of their customers; 
this also explains the high implicit interest rates of trade credit.  Uchida, Udell & 
Watanabe ’06 find results that suggest trade creditors acquire private soft information 
over time, and use this to set trade financing terms.   
1.4.2 Price Discrimination 
Trade credit may also be used by suppliers to price discriminate, or to 
circumvent legal restrictions against price discrimination (Meltzer ’60, Mian & Smith ’92, 
Petersen & Rajan ’97).  The price discrimination view of trade credit views longer credit 
terms as an effective drop in the price of the product, especially to credit constrained 
customers.  This allows the supplier to appeal to the most price elastic segments of the 
market.   
Closely related to the relationship building motive of trade credit extension, 
Petersen & Rajan ’97 also posit that trade credit may allow suppliers to discriminate in 
favor of customers who suppliers have a long-term interest in, and where suppliers may 
“protect the value of their implicit equity stake in the customer by providing it 
temporary short term financing”. 
1.4.3 Quality Assurance 
Long, Malitz & Ravid ’93 proposes that buyers withhold payment in order to 
ascertain product quality, before paying.  Accordingly, the purpose of trade credit is to 
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allow customers sufficient time to test the product.  Information asymmetry regarding 
product quality therefore induces trade credit.  Moreover, this varies by product 
characteristics, with high-tech, or newly developed products requiring more quality 
assurance than others, such as commodities (Fisman & Love ’03).  Murfin & Njoroge ’12 
use data on warranty claims to find support for the hypothesis that “uncertainty 
regarding product quality” is an important driver of trade credit financing.   
Additionally, the choice of trade credit terms offered by suppliers may serve as a 
signaling device with respect to product quality (Lee & Stowe ’93).  
1.5 Trade Credit and the Macroeconomy 
The final section of this literature survey addresses the effects of trade credit 
supply on the economy.  Research in this section addresses the macroeconomic impact 
of credit supply due to trade credit, as well as the effect of the structure of counterparty 
risks due to supplier-customer relationships during financial crises.  A related area of 
research on trade credit and the macroeconomy, specifically the role of trade credit in an 
underdeveloped financial system, has also been addressed in Section 1.3.3.  Moreover, 
the discussion on trade credit and the monetary transmission mechanism is also related 
to the discussion in Section 1.3.2 on Trade Credit and Financial Crises.  
1.5.1 Trade Credit and Monetary Transmission 
Meltzer ’60 concluded that “when money is tightened, firms with relatively large 
cash balances increased the average length of time for which credit was extended.  And 
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this extension of trade credit appears to have favored those firms against whom credit 
rationing is said to discriminate”.  Duca ’86 and Jaffee & Stiglitz ’89 present evidence to 
support Meltzer ‘60’s redistribution hypothesis.  On the other hand, Gertler & Gilchrist 
’93 and Oliner & Rudebusch ’96 find that trade credit does not rise during monetary 
contractions.  Kohler, Britton & Yates ’00 further examine the “trade credit channel” by 
studying a large panel of UK publicly listed firms.  They find that listed firms (which 
they take to be firms with direct capital markets access extend more trade, and consume 
less during recessions.  Moreover, during a monetary contraction, quoted firms also, on 
net, supply more trade credit.  They interpret their findings as consistent with, though 
not conclusive, that the trade credit channel of financing mitigates the effect of policy 
tightening on real activity.  More recently, Nilsen ’05 find that large firms without a 
bond rating also increase trade credit consumption during monetary contractions; since 
few firms have a bond rating, they posit this result as pointing to more firms being 
affected by credit constraints than previously believed. 
1.5.2 Trade Credit and Counterparty Risks 
The use of trade credit also results in an economy wide structure of counter party 
risks between suppliers and customers.  Jorion & Zhang ’09 provide an empirical 
analysis of credit contagion via direct counterparty effects (trade credit relationships 
between supplier and customers), and find that bankruptcy announcements cause 
negative abnormal equity returns and increases in CDS spreads for creditors of the 
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announcing firms.  In particular, a bankruptcy announcement by a trade debtor results 
in an abnormal equity return -1.9% for the trade creditor, translating into a loss of $174 
million for the median creditor.  CDS spreads on the creditor increase by 5 basis points 
over the same window.  The authors posit that counterparty risks due to trade credit 
provides a potential explanation for observed default clustering.  These empirical 
findings are consistent with Boissay ’06 theoretical model of credit chaining due to trade 
credit linkages.  In this model of financial contagion, default of one firm results in a 
chain reaction that affects even previously sound creditors.  Boissay ’06 calibrates the 
model using US annual data from 1986 to 2004, and finds that when customers of a 
sound firm are distressed, the firm itself gets into financial difficulties with probability 
that ranges from 4.1% to 12.8%; defaults on trade debts lower aggregate U.S. GDP by at 
least 0.4%.  Raddatz ’10 presents evidence that an increase in the use of trade credit 
along input output chains results in an increase in their output correlation, supporting 
the presence of credit-chain propagation and amplification described in Kiyotaki & 
Moore ’97, as well as Boissay ’06.  Credit chaining is also consistent with widespread 
evidence that firms typically respond to late payments by customers by delaying 
payments to their own trade creditors (McMillan & Woodruff ’99, Boissay & Gropp ’07). 
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2. Trade Credit, Firm Maturation and Survival 
Trade credit is an important source of finance.  It represented approximately 2.4 
times the combined value of all new public debt and primary equity issues annually 
from 2000 to 2009.  In this regard, trade credit finances nearly as much of small business 
assets in the US as commercial banks (16% versus 19%, Berger & Udell, ’98).   
Despite this, there is still much we do not know about why industrial firms 
supply costly trade credit, or especially, what the economic outcomes of supplying trade 
credit are.  Much of the existing empirical literature on the supply of trade credit has 
regarded trade credit suppliers as a homogeneous class by focusing on the comparative 
advantage that these suppliers enjoy in financing their customers compared to financial 
institutions.  This strand of research addresses how industrial suppliers have the 
capacity to finance their customers, although not necessarily what they seek to gain from 
doing so.  Another equally prominent area of research in trade credit has been the 
economic outcomes for customers.  This area of research addresses the role that trade 
credit plays in alleviating financial constraints for customers that may otherwise be 
rationed by financial institutions or public markets.  Notwithstanding, benefits to the 
suppliers of trade credit have not been studied in as much detail. 
One of the difficulties in assessing the incentives and outcomes of supplying 
trade credit is the lack of extensive research on the longitudinal outcomes of trade credit 
policy.  Many existing papers focus on explaining cross sectional variation in trade 
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credit usage and supply, rather than relating trade credit supply policy early on to 
outcomes later in a supplier’s lifecycle.  The latter question remains an open question 
empirically.  The real economic significance of supplying trade credit has thus not been 
quantified in detail thus far, and this paper seeks to fill this gap by studying if suppliers 
provide trade credit in support of particular firm growth and maturation agendas. 
I do so by examining empirical regularities in the provision of trade credit over a 
supplier’s lifecycle, and examining how trade credit policies early in a supplier’s 
lifecycle affect subsequent economic outcomes.  I exploit variation in two measures of 
supplier expenditure on trade credit: supplier doubtful receivables and receivables 
length.  The economic implications of these two measures are trade credit standards 
adopted by the supplier, and duration of credit extension respectively.  With these 
measures, I identify a peak in supplier spending on trade credit relatively early in the 
lifecycle, close to the IPO year.  Investment in trade credit steadily declines with supplier 
age thereafter.  I use a two stage least squares approach, instrumenting for customer 
demand for trade credit in the first stage to verify that these trends are supplier, rather 
than customer driven.   
My empirical evidence is consistent with three theoretical predictions.  First, 
young suppliers lower trade credit standards early in their lifecycle to build customer 
supplier relationships.  Suppliers are compensated for their investment into trade credit 
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over the span of the relationship, rather than receiving a return immediately on their 
investment.  
Second, young suppliers with more complex products extend trade credit for a 
longer duration; product complexity however has no effect on trade credit standards.  
This is consistent with the quality assuarance theory of trade credit.  Young suppliers 
with unestablished product market reputations, producing products that require greater 
time and effort to inspect correspondingly extend trade credit for a greater period of 
time in order to provide customers with assurance on product quality.   
Third, I show that financially constraints have an economically significant effect 
on suppliers’ ability to provide trade credit, consistent with the financing view.  This 
implies that trade credit supply is one of the channels through which financial 
constraints have a real economic effect on the development of firms, by limiting their 
ability to meet relationship building and quality assurance goals.   
I show that young suppliers’ investment in trade credit is a high risk-high return 
corporate strategy.  On one hand, suppliers with lower trade credit standards and longer 
receivables duration experience an economically significant increase in number of 
unique customers and revenue per customer respectively.  However, both measures of 
trade credit investment is also significantly related to the hazard of supplier attrition.  
This is consistent with young suppliers adopting greater credit risk, and longer duration 
loans (trade credit provision) being riskier than shorter duration loans. 
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These results have implications for our understanding of young firm attrition 
rates, as well as the endogeneous structure of counter party risk.  The literature has 
documented high attrition rates for young firms; for instance, Moskowitz & Jorgenssen 
’00 show a 90% attrition rate within the first ten years.  My paper demonstrates a novel 
reason for this, namely trade credit supply.  Additionally, Jorion & Zhang ’09 find 
evidence of credit chaining due to trade credit supply.  My paper sheds light on one of 
the factors influencing the structure of counterparty risks between industrial firms – the 
incentives of suppliers to forge customer-supplier relationships, and also provide 
assurance on product quality.   
The next section of this paper surveys implications from theories of trade credit 
that I am able to test in the data.  Section 1.2 lays out my hypotheses, Section 1.3 
describes the data and empirical strategy pertaining to verifying that observed trade 
credit supply trends across suppliers’ lifecycles are driven from the supply rather than 
demand side.  Section 1.4 analyzes the relationship between supplier lifecycle stage and 
trade credit provision, and evidence pertaining to the economic outcomes of trade credit 
provision.  Discussion of implications and concluding remarks are presented in the final 
section of Chapter 1. 
2.1 Theories of Trade Credit and Lifecycle Implications 
Trade credit may be provided to promote sales by establishing customer-
supplier relationships, validate product quality, reduce transactions costs, price 
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discriminate, or finance customers by exploiting supplier comparative advantage over 
financial institutions.  Trade credit provision may lastly also be the result of customers 
exercising market power to extract favorable terms from suppliers.   
Nadiri ’69 mentions that “trade credit is a capital investment that, by establishing 
permanent relations between lender and borrower, provides the lender with returns 
over time”.  In my empirical tests, I assume that suppliers need to lower trade credit 
standards for the purposes of establishing relationships with potential customers for two 
reasons.  First, information asymmetry.  Suppliers may not be able to determine ex ante 
the credit quality of potential customers.  In this situation, suppliers may either decline 
to provide any credit (potentially losing the sale), or provide credit without an adequate 
knowledge of the customer’s repayment probability.  Second, support of financially 
distressed customers (Wilner ’00, Cunat ‘07).  Suppliers may knowingly provide credit 
to distressed customers if the expectation of relationship profitability (assuming the 
customer recovers) is high enough.   
Relationship building incentives could decline with supplier age.  First, young 
suppliers have fewer existing customer-supplier relationships, and therefore have a 
greater need to use trade credit towards this end.  Second, younger suppliers may have 
an advantage over their older counterparts in relationship building due to 
organizational form.  Stein ’02 shows that smaller suppliers may be better able to 
leverage all available information, both hard and soft, on customers.  This facilitates 
 31 
relationship building by enabling suppliers to extend risky credit based on customer soft 
information.  Third, older, and therefore larger suppliers may be less willing to engage 
in similar behavior due to diminishing returns to scale; additionally, larger, established 
suppliers may be less willing to engage younger customers due to differences in 
technological background and cannabalization of existing product sales based on older 
technology.   
Smith ’87, Long, Malitz and Ravid ’93 also argue that trade credit can be used to 
allow a supplier to provide assurance on product quality.  This is especially if the quality 
of a product cannot be verified immediately due to product complexity.  Trade credit 
can then allow the buyer to ascertain product quality before final payment.  Using a 
sample of white-box suppliers who sell to Walmart, Murfin & Njoroge ’12 find an 
empirical relationship between warranty terms (as a measure of product quality) and 
trade credit duration extended.   
The need to extend trade credit for product quality validation purposes should 
also decline with supplier age, as suppliers are able to establish product market 
reputations and customers gain more experience with supplier products.  Hence, 
average duration of trade credit extended should decrease with supplier age too.   
Suppliers may also have a comparative advantage over financial institutions and 
other traditional lenders in financing customers.  This could be due to advantages in 
information acquisition (Smith ’87, Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner ’88, Biais, Gollier 
 32 
and Viala ’93, etc), advantages in enforcing payment since trade inputs may be less 
substitutable than financial credit, ease of collateral liquidation if the supplier already 
has the distribution channels for selling repossessed trade inputs (Mian and Smith ’92) 
and lower divertibility of trade inputs relative to financial capital (Burkart & Ellingsen 
’04, Cunat ’07, Giannetti et al ’11).   
A corollary of the financing theory is that trade credit also provides a channel for 
financial credit to flow from traditional lenders to large, well-financed suppliers, and 
then to small, financially constrained customers.  This view predicts a positive 
relationship between supplier age and trade credit provision, assuming that older 
suppliers are, on average, financially more robust compared to their younger 
counterparts. 
 Trade credit provision by suppliers may also be driven by customer factors.  
Fabbri & Klapper ’08, using a sample of SMEs from China, find that firms with weaker 
market power are likely to provide more trade credit.  This raises the possibility that 
young firms with few existing customers may be subjected to exercise of monopsony 
power by larger/older and more well established firms.  This explanation complicates 
my empirical analysis in the sense that it would also result in a decreasing relationship 
between supplier age and investment in trade credit (similar to the relationship building 
and quality assurance theories).   
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Lastly, trade credit may be offered to price discriminate (Meltzer ’60, Schwartz & 
Whitcomb ’79, Mian & Smith ’92).  This is because the extension of credit is equivalent in 
essence to a price reduction, and allows a supplier to capture the consumer surplus for 
existing customers while catering to the needs of price elastic customers who are likely 
to take a greater amount of time to repay.  As antitrust laws prohibit explicit price 
discrimination, suppliers may implement the price reduction using trade credit instead.  
Young suppliers with new products may potentially use price discrimination to capture 
market share from existing industry participants.  In this case, suppliers with a higher 
profit margin will have a stronger incentive to make additional sales, if they can hold 
constant price on their existing customers.   
2.2 Hypotheses 
The goals of this paper are threefold.  First, to determine if there are regular 
lifecycle patterns in the supply of trade credit, which influence how suppliers grow and 
evolve.  Second, if there are lifecycle trends, what is the economic significance of 
supplying trade credit early in a supplier’s lifecycle, in terms of outcomes on growth and 
survival.  Third, is trade credit one of the channels through which supplier financial 
constraints affect real economic outcomes.   
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Figure 1: Trade Credit Risks over Supplier Lifecycle 
Fig 1 provides a quick over of variation in trade credit provision over a supplier’s 
lifecycle.  Doubtful receivables in the graph on the left is gross supplier doubtful 
receivables normalized by total receivables.  Gross doubtful receivables is most 
commonly estimated in practice based on receivables aging (Gentry, Vaidyanathan & 
Lee ’90), which assigns a higher default probability to older receivables.  Total doubtful 
receivables under this methodology is then the sum of the estimated doubtful amount 
for receivables in each age category.  Receivables length for the graph on the right is 
computed as net accounts receivables normalized by total receivables.  Appendix A 
provides a worked example.  
I find a peak in trade credit provision for both doubtful receivables as well as 
receivables length around a supplier’s IPO year, or shortly thereafter.  Both measures of 
investment in trade credit decline steadily as suppliers age thereafter.  This is suggestive 
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of increased trade credit provision having a specific role to play relatively early in a 
supplier’s lifecycle.  Moreover, the convex relationship between investment in trade 
credit, and supplier age suggest that there are three distinct stages across a supplier’s 
lifecycle pertaining to investment in trade credit: first, the Pre-IPO stage, with a positive 
relationship between trade credit and supplier age, second, the IPO stage, where 
investment in trade credit peaks, and lastly, the Post-IPO stage, where trade credit 
declines with age.  Based on these three lifecycle stages, I offer the following three 
hypotheses to explain the trends above: 
H1:  Suppliers lower trade credit standards when young to build customer 
supplier relationships.  
Hypotheses 1 draws on the lessening incentives of suppliers to build 
relationships when they age, as discussed in Section 1.1, and therefore predicts a 
negative relationship between supplier age and doubtful receivables.  Amongst young 
suppliers, the relationship building motive is likely to also vary across industry.  
Customer-supplier relationships are likely more significant in industries where either 
party has to make relationship specific investments, and where there is significant 
differentiation amongst products; conversely, customer-supplier relationships will be 
less important in commodities based industries.  Empirically, I will use the existence of 
principal customer relationships in a specific industry as a measure of whether 
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customer-supplier relationships play a significant role in that industry (I will return to a 
discussion of this measure in Section 1.3).  H1 results in the following three predictions: 
 
Prediction 1A:  [Pre IPO]*[RelationshipInd] and [IPO]*[RelationshipInd] are 
positively related to [Doubtful Receivables].   
This prediction is based on the premise that lower credit standards are 
significantly related to relationship building because it allows a supplier to interact with 
a greater number of potential customers.  This would be either in the context of 
information asymmetry, or if suppliers decide to support risky customers because of the 
potential for payoff over the term of the relationship.  Young firms in the Pre IPO and 
IPO stages of their lifecycle, and which are in relationship industries should have a 
higher level of doubtful receivables (i.e. lower trade credit standards). 
 
Prediction 1B:  Contemporaneous [Doubtful Receivables] is positively related to 
growth in [# Customer Relationships] over a 5 year time horizon. 
If suppliers lower trade credit standards for the purpose of establishing 
relationships with a greater number of potential customers, then contemporaneous 
doubtful receivables should be positively related to growth in the number of unique 
customers over the medium term.  Alternatively, if variation in observable doubtful 
receivables is due to non-relationship building reasons such as deviations in accounting 
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recognition, then we should not see a significantly positively relationship with customer 
relationship growth.   
 
Prediction 1C:  [Doubtful Receivables] is positively related to hazard of supplier 
attrition.  This is because younger firms assume greater credit risk. 
Lower trade credit standards increases the probability of supplier attrition 
because it results in exposure to riskier credit prospects.  One implication is that trade 
credit policy could be one explanation for documented population moments on young 
firm attrition in the literature. 
 
H2:  Suppliers provide trade credit to allow validation of product quality 
Prediction 2A:  [Pre IPO]*[R&D] and [IPO]*[R&D] are positively related to 
[Receivables Length]  
Prediction 2A stems from the premise that duration of trade credit offered is 
significantly related to the time that customers require to determine product quality.  
Long, Malitz and Ravid ’93 postulate that complex products requiring a greater 
proportion of R&D input are likely to attract greater product quality concerns relative to 
commoditized products.  Hence, young suppliers without established product market 
reputations, producing products that require a greater proportion of R&D investment 
are likely to offer longer trade credit durations.  I therefore predict a negative 
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relationship between supplier age and receivables length, especially for R&D intensive 
suppliers. 
 
Prediction 2B:  Contemporaneous [Receivables Length] is positively related to 
revenue growth in the future. 
Similar to Prediction 1C, if suppliers are rationally extending trade credit 
duration for the purpose of validating product quality, this should result in greater 
future revenue growth. 
 
Prediction 2C:  If longer duration loans are riskier than shorter duration loans, 
then [Receivables Length] should be positively related to supplier attrition. 
Extension of trade credit for longer durations may expose customers to greater 
counter party risk, since the probability of encountering a negative shock to customer 
welfare increases with the length of the loan.  Hence, receivables length should also be 
positively related to supplier attrition.   
 
H3:  Constrained firms cannot supply as much trade credit 
Prediction 3:  [Financial Constraints] is negatively related to [Doubtful Receivables] 
and [Receivables Length] 
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Hypothesis 3 states that trade credit provision is a significant channel through 
which financial constraints has an impact on real economic outcomes for supplier 
development; in this paper, I use supplier payout ratio as a measure of supplier financial 
constraints (Almeida & Campello ’07, Denis & Sibikov ’10).  To the extent that younger 
suppliers are more likely to experience binding constraints compared to older suppliers, 
this hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between supplier age and trade credit 
extension. 
Alternative explanations:   
Observable trade credit provision may be influenced by either supply side, or 
demand (customer) side factors.  Specifically, customers may exercise market power to 
induce suppliers to provide concessions such as longer receivables length, or to provide 
credit to a large customer close to financial distress.   
I address this possibility empirically by instrumenting for average distance to 
financial distress of firms in a supplier’s customer industry.  This is because customers 
will have a greater incentive to demand additional trade credit from suppliers if they are 
distressed.  However, because customer financial distress is also related to supplier 
propensity to finance it with trade credit, I separate supply and demand side factors by 
instrumenting for customer distance to default in a two stage least squares estimation.    
A second possible explanation is that young firms are extending trade credit as a 
means of circumventing legal restrictions on price discrimination, in order to capture 
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market share.  The incentive to price discriminate should be stronger amongst suppliers 
with a higher profit margin as discussed in Section 1.1.  Hence, I test this explanation 
empirically by including supplier profit margin as one of the explanatory variables for 
investment in trade credit.  Table 1 summarizes predictions from the three hypotheses as 
well as the alternative explanations 
There are two categories of predictions in Table 1.  The first type of prediction 
has a trade credit variable as the dependent variable, and where the objective is to 
explain trade credit provision.  The second type of prediction has a trade credit variable 
as an independent variable, and the objective is to quantify the economic outcomes of 
trade credit supply. 
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2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
I draw on two datasets for this paper.   First, I use the main Compustat file to 
obtain information about supplier doubful receivables as well as receivables length.  
Supplier and customer data are linked at the industry level by using the BEA Input 
Output tables.  This allows me to measure, for each supplier industry, what is the 
average distance to financial distress, profitability, size, etc of firms in its customer 
industries.   
Second, I use the Compustat Business Information File to obtain information 
about principal supplier customer pairs.  FASB SFAS No. 14 as historically required the 
disclosure of principal / key customers that account for more than 10% of an 
enterprises’s revenue.  Additionally, SEC Regulation S-K Item 101 has historically also 
required naming a major customer if sales to that customer equal 10% or more of the 
issuer’s revenues, and if the loss of the customer would have a material adverse effect on 
the issuer1.  This information on principal customers is available in the Compustat 
Business Information File.   
I use this dataset to define relationship based industries as industries where any 
of the suppliers have principal customer relationships.  This measure correlates well 
                                                     
1 Some suppliers in our dataset report principal customers that contribute less than 10% of total sales 
because the supplier considers the sale materially important to the business.  Banerjee, Dasgupta & Kim ’08 
mention that such cases are included to establish a customer as a long-term (public) customer.  To the extent 
that suppliers consider such relationships significant to their revenues, I include all observations on listed 
principal customers in my analysis, even those where reported sales percentage are below 10%. 
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with measures of relationship specific investments that have been used in the literature.  
For instance, I find that suppliers in the durable goods industry are classified as 
relationship based using my measure.  This is consistent with the high level of 
relationship specific investments expected of suppliers in these industries. 
Observed trade credit provision is determined simultaneously by both supplier 
and customer factors.  However, I am only interested in isolating supplier driven factors 
in this paper.  Market power is a necessary condition for customers to expropriate credit 
extension from suppliers. Empirically, suppliers facing high HHI customer industries 
may be forced to give out trade credit.  I test that my estimation is robust to customer 
driven factors by excluding this group.  
Additionally, trade credit standards and receivables length are likely to be 
influenced by many similar variables.  Error terms between both equations should be 
correlated.  I increase the efficiency of my estimate by using this correlation structure via 
seemingly unrelated regression. 
2.4 Supplier Lifecycle Stage and Trade Credit Provision 
Summary Statistics 
Tables 1 & 2 divides suppliers into 3 stages of their lifecycle:  Pre IPO, IPO and 
Post IPO.  These are firm-year observations before a supplier’s IPO, between the IPO 
year and five years hence, as well as more than five years after the IPO.  Additionally, I 
divide the suppliers by average customer characteristics in two ways:  by customer size 
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(Table 1), as well as customer profitability (Table 2).  Customer data for Table 1 & 2 are 
based on principal customer supplier data, subject to at least 50% of sales being 
accounted for by principal customers. 
 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Doubtful Receivables and Receivables Length 
(segmented by customer size) 
Table 1 provides average doubtful receivables and receivables length for suppliers by stage of lifecycle (as 
defined in Section 2.4).  In addition, average customer size is determined from the Compustat Business 
Information file.  Lifecycle stage is associated with significant variation in both measures of trade credit risk, 
regardless of customer size. 
 Doubtful Receivables 
 Average Customer Assets <= 50th 
Percentile 
Average Customer Assets > 50th Percentile 
Pre IPO 5.06% 6.01% 
IPO 6.05% 5.06% 
Post IPO 4.49% 3.77% 
 Receivables Length 
Pre IPO 90.6 days 85.1 days 
IPO 90.2 days 77.9 days 
Post IPO 60.7 days 64.9 days 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics on Doubtful Receivables and Receivables Length 
(segmented by customer profitability) 
Table 2 provides average doubtful receivables and receivables length for suppliers by stage of lifecycle (as 
defined in Section 2.4).  In addition, average customer profitability is determined from the Compustat 
Business Information file.  Lifecycle stage is associated with significant variation in both measures of trade 
credit risk, regardless of customer profitability.   
 Doubtful Receivables 
 Non Profitable Customers Profitable Customers 
Pre IPO 5.73% 5.53% 
IPO 6.86% 5.11% 
Post IPO 4.92% 3.86% 
 Receivables Length 
Pre IPO 97.8 days 85.1 days 
IPO 93.0 days 80.3 days 
Post IPO 62.0 days 64.3 days 
 
Tables 1 & 2 show that supplier investment in trade credit (whether in terms of 
doubtful receivables or receivables length) is significantly dependent on stage of 
supplier lifecycle, even after controlling for customer characteristics.  Specifically, young 
firms adopt lower trade credit standards and offer longer receivables length than older 
firms.   
My measure of firm age is relative to the IPO event (with old firms being 
classified as having done their initial offering more than 5 years ago).  My hypotheses 
are consistent with firms in the IPO window going public to obtain funds for the 
realization of growth options; indeed, assuming a heightened level of risk in trade credit 
provision may represent one such use of funds obtained from the IPO, and therefore, 
also a viable pro-growth corporate policy for high growth IPO firms. 
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Table 3:  Coefficient Estimates from SUR Estimation (Doubtful Receivables 
Equation) 
Table 3 presents coefficient estimates from a SUR estimation with doubtful receivables and receivables 
length as the dependent variables.  Estimates involving the doubtful receivables equation are presented in 
this table, while estimates for receivables length are presented in Table 4.  Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. 
 (i) (ii) 
Entire Sample Removed suppliers facing 
high HHI customer industries 
Receivables Length -0.0964*** -0.104*** 
(16.21) (14.02) 
Pre IPO -0.0125*** -0.0131*** 
(3.062) (3.246) 
IPO -0.0042 -0.0035 
(1.373) (0.907) 
Relationship Industry -0.0044*** -0.0007 
(2.796) (0.342) 
Relationship Industry*Pre IPO 0.00142 0.00308 
(0.347) (0.768) 
Relationship Industry*IPO 0.00712** 0.00713* 
  (2.381) (1.889) 
Ln(Research Expense) 0.00144*** 0.00183*** 
(3.741) (3.896) 
Ln(Research Expense)*PreIPO -0.0002 -0.0004 
  (0.211) (0.366) 
Ln(Research Expense)*IPO -0.0001 -1.42e-5 
(0.185) (0.0193) 
Payout Ratio 0.0498*** 0.0543*** 
  (4.673) (4.474) 
Profit Margin -7.28e-5*** -6.87e-5*** 
(6.42) (4.23) 
Fraction Govt Sales -0.0205*** -0.0220*** 
(6.315) (5.265) 
Payables Length 0.0246*** 0.0223*** 
(14.84) (12.07) 
Ln (Total Assets) -0.0068*** -0.0073*** 
(20.92) (17.01) 
GDP Growth -0.00285*** -0.00230** 
(5.884) (2.344) 
Constant 0.102*** 0.0996*** 
(11.74) (5.183) 
Industry and Year FE Y Y 
Observations 117,525 71,319 
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Table 4:  Coefficient Estimates from SUR Estimation (Receivables Length 
Equation) 
Table 4 presents coefficient estimates from a SUR estimation with doubtful receivables and receivables 
length as the dependent variables.  Estimates involving the receivables length equation are presented in 
this table, while estimates for doubtful receivables were presented in Table 3.  Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. 
 (i) (ii) 
Entire Sample 
Removed suppliers facing 
high HHI customer industries 
Doubtful Receivables -0.146*** -0.165*** 
(16.52) (14.60) 
Pre IPO -0.00973** -0.00722 
(2.075) (1.106) 
IPO -0.00149 -0.00262 
(0.394) (0.494) 
Relationship Industry 0.00386** 0.00735*** 
(2.157) (2.850) 
Relationship Industry*Pre IPO 0.009 0.00976 
(1.479) (1.457) 
Relationship Industry*IPO 0.00389 0.00516 
  (1.056) (1.006) 
Ln(Research Expense) 0.00146* 0.0003 
(1.870) (0.324) 
Ln(Research Expense)*PreIPO 0.0044*** 0.00434** 
  (2.933) (2.362) 
Ln(Research Expense)*IPO 0.0004 0.0007 
(0.461) (0.662) 
Payout Ratio 0.0863*** 0.0670*** 
  (4.312) (3.472) 
Profit Margin -0.0002*** -0.0003** 
(4.101) (2.483) 
Fraction Govt Sales 0.0104*** 0.0104** 
(2.733) (2.509) 
Payables Length 0.0738*** 0.0702*** 
(19.28) (15.01) 
Ln (Total Assets) 0.0002 0.0006 
(0.296) (0.775) 
GDP Growth 0.0040*** 0.0050*** 
(6.098) (3.048) 
Constant 0.0939*** 0.0970*** 
(7.304) (7.034) 
Industry and Year FE Y Y 
Observations 117,525 71,319 
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These results are supported by the 2SLS estimations in Tables 3 & 4.  Table 3 
shows that young firms in relationship industries at the Pre IPO and IPO stages of their 
lifecycle adopt lower credit standards, while Table 4 supports the conclusion that young 
firms with R&D intensive products offer longer receivables length.  These are consistent 
with Predictions 1A and 2A respectively.  Financial constraints (as proxied by supplier 
payout ratio) is also a factor in supplier ability to invest in trade credit.  Suppliers with 
higher payout ratios adopt lower trade credit standards, as well as offer longer 
receivables length.  A robustness test of Tables 3 & 4, using Ln (Doubtful Receivables) 
instead of Doubtful Receivables, is found in the Appendix; Table 13 is a SUR estimation 
of Ln (Doubtful Receivables) and Receivables Length, after excluding suppliers facing 
high HHI customer industries. 
I also find that supplier expected profit margin is inversely related to doubtful 
receivables as well as receivables length.  Expected profit margin in Table 3 and 4 has 
been computed by adding doubtful receivables to net income, and is therefore the profit 
margin that the supplier should expect “if none of its customers were to default on trade 
credit”.  Interestingly, suppliers that have lower expected profit margins also tend to 
have lower trade credit standards, and offer longer receivables length.  This is 
inconsistent with the view that observed trade credit provision is being driven by the 
intent to price discriminate.  Another conclusion I draw from this inverse relationship 
between doubtful receivables/receivables length and expected profit margin is that 
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suppliers do not expect to be compensated for their increased investment in trade credit 
in the short term.  This is consistent with my relationship building hypothesis.   
Table 5:  Outcomes of Trade Credit Policy – Customer Acquisition and 
Revenue 
Table 5 estimates via ordinary least squares the relationship between trade credit risks and supplier 
outcomes.  % change in number of customers over next 5 years and % change in revenue per customer over 
next 5 years are both computed using number of principal customers from the Compustat Business 
Information file.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
  % change in 
number of 
customers over 
next 5 years 
% change in 
number of 
customers over 
next 5 years 
% change in 
revenue per 
customer over 
next 5 years 
% change in 
revenue per 
customer over 
next 5 years 
Doubtful Receivables 0.065*** 0.078** -0.250 -0.285 
  (3.40) (2.23) (0.77) (0.88) 
Receivables Length 0.000 -0.000 0.001** 0.001* 
  (1.12) (0.39) (2.02) (1.89) 
Supplier Size   0.007***   -0.002 
    (4.71)   (0.24) 
Payout Ratio   0.000   0.010*** 
    (0.16)   (9.70) 
Debt Ratio   -0.011   -0.086 
    (0.96)   (1.45) 
Advertising Expense    0.108   1.439*** 
    (1.55)   (2.66) 
Cash (by assets)   -0.084***   0.100 
    (4.48)   (0.95) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
69,202 68,912 6.572 6.559 
R squared 9.04% 9.10% 8.99% 9.49% 
Customer financial distress does not have a statistically significant effect on 
supplier doubtful receivables, and is inversely related to receivables length - suppliers 
appear to grant more credit worthy customers longer credit duration.  This is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that customers exercise market power to induce 
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additional trade credit provision by suppliers, if we assume that customers in distress 
are more likely to do so.  Rather, after controlling for customer financial distress, 
supplier lifecycle still significantly predicts investment in trade credit.   
Table 6:  Outcomes of Trade Credit Policy – Revenue Growth and Returns to 
Shareholders 
Table 6 estimates via ordinary least squares the relationship between trade credit risks and supplier 
revenues outcomes over the next 5 years, as well as returns to shareholders over the next 5 years at the 
firm year level.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
  (i) (ii) 
Dependent Variable  Average 5 year growth  
in Revenues 
Average 5 Year Returns to Shareholders 
  
Doubtful Receivables 1.271*** 0.110 
  (3.08) (0.78) 
Receivables Length 1.605*** -0.330 
  (3.47) (1.25) 
Firm Size -0.055*** -0.030*** 
  (5.54) (5.21) 
Payables Length 0.061 -0.002 
  (0.66) (0.06) 
State GDP Growth 0.218*** -0.222*** 
  (18.58) (8.72) 
Advertising Expense -0.110 0.200 
  (0.15) (0.86) 
Capital Expenditures 0.000 0.000 
  (0.69) (0.22) 
Market to Book 0.074*** -0.013*** 
  (7.32) (3.30) 
Debt Ratio -0.378*** 0.077*** 
  (4.87) (2.30) 
Research Expense 0.363*** 0.004 
  (3.43) (0.18) 
Fraction Government Sales 0.035 -0.046 
  (0.36) (0.45) 
Beta -0.024 0.129*** 
  (0.65) (4.48) 
Constant -0.471*** -0.329*** 
  (6.89) (3.82) 
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Observations 91,011 91,011 
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Table 5 runs an OLS estimation of supplier outcomes across a five year horizon 
against investment in trade credit.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show that doubtful 
receivables are significantly related to growth in number of unique principal customers 
over the next five years, while duration of trade credit extended is not; this is consistent 
with the prediction that suppliers lower credit standards in order to interact with a 
greater number of potential customers, and inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis 
that variation in doubtful receivables is due to deviations in accounting recognition. 
Columns (3) and (4) regress % change in revenue per customer against both trade credit 
variables.  Doubtful receivables do not have any significantly positive relationship with 
this metric, potentially due to credit standards influencing suppliers’ ability to engage 
specific customers, rather than the degree of engagement / sales.  Conversely, I find that 
receivables length is significantly related to increased revenue per customer, consistent 
with the quality assurance hypothesis. 
Table 6 demonstrates that this policy is optimal by showing that it is unrelated to 
significantly negative shareholder returns.  Market efficiency indicates that supplier 
trade credit policy should not be an ‘abnormal return factor’ for shareholders. 
Table 7 estimates a proportional hazards model of supplier attrition against 
supplier investment in trade credit.  Both measures of investment in trade credit are 
positively related to the supplier going out of business, validating prediction 1C and 2C, 
that both the assumption of increased credit risk, and extension of longer duration loans 
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raise supplier risk.  Coupled with the results from Tables 5A and B, this finding provides 
a novel explanation for the high attrition rates of young firms that have been 
documented (e.g. Moskowitz & Jorgensen ’02).   
To the extent that trade credit provision also results in credit chaining due to 
counterparty risks across supply chains (Jorion & Zhang ’09), my paper also makes 
novel predictions about how the structure of counterparty risk may evolve 
endogeneously – namely that young firms lower credit standards and extend receivables 
duration (hence selecting for riskier credits) to establish relationships and reputations. 
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Table 7:  Attrition Risk 
Table 7 estimates a proportional hazards model of firm attrition (not due to mergers and acquisitions) at the 
firm-year level.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Doubtful Receivables 1.476*** 
  (11.267) 
Receivables Length 0.276** 
  (2.156) 
Change in Total Debt 0.00211 
  (0.868) 
Firm Size -0.138*** 
  (19.714) 
Fraction Government Sales -0.319*** 
  (3.038) 
GDP Growth 0.0144 
  (0.979) 
Market to Book Ratio -0.100*** 
  (10.266) 
Payables Length 0.0516* 
  (1.939) 
Acquisitions -0.000454*** 
  (2.718) 
Advertising Expense 0.412* 
  (1.925) 
Capital Expense -0.282 
  (1.396) 
Research Expense 0.00397 
  
(1.396) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 97761 
Log Likelihood -56327.094 
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2.5 Conclusion 
I find that young suppliers invest significantly in trade credit provision early in 
their lifecycle in order to advance product market agendas via relationship building 
with potential customers as well as provide validation of product quality.  Investment is 
via decreasing trade credit standards, as well as increasing receivables duration, is 
robust to controlling for customer side characteristics, and is costly to the supplier – the 
ability to provide trade credit in support of growth agendas is therefore one of the 
channels through which financial constraints have an impact on the early development 
of suppliers.  Lastly, I find significant outcomes to investments in trade credit in terms of 
revenue growth as well as increased supplier risk, the latter being a novel explanation 
for the high attrition rates of young firms that have been documented in the literature. 
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3. Trade Credit Standards and Relationship Building:  
Supplier Response to FTAs 
In Chapter 2 (Ee ’13), I studied trade credit provision over supplier lifecycles, and 
found evidence consistent with young suppliers lowering trade credit standards and 
extending receivables period to build customer-supplier relationships and signal 
product quality over a subsequent five year period.  Young suppliers were found to 
assume greater risks in trade credit provision to facilitate product market maturity for 
the firm.  The paper also found that older firms do not engage in this corporate policy in 
equilibrium.  This is partially because younger suppliers have a greater incentive to 
invest in reputation formation than older suppliers (Diamond ’89); the longer track 
record of older suppliers implies that they do not have to expend as much effort to 
signal product quality.  
One puzzle from Ee ’13 was that older firms, on the whole, did not use variation 
in trade credit standards to form new customer-supplier relationships in equilibrium.  
Why is this corporate policy exercised more by young suppliers rather than older 
suppliers in equilibrium?  This is a significant question given that older suppliers 
typically have a greater capacity to supply trade credit compared to younger suppliers.  
From 2000 to 2009, around 67.3% of outstanding trade receivables balance each year was 
held by older firms.  Understanding the incentives of older suppliers to vary trade credit 
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standards is relevant to the flow of credit between industrial firms as well as the 
aggregate supply of credit economy wide.   
To study this question in greater detail, I exploit the introduction of major free 
trade agreements (FTAs) as a shock to existing supplier-customer relationships, and 
examine the reactions of both young and old firms to this shock.  FTAs may increase the 
amount of competition to domestic firms, and result in the fracturing of existing supplier 
customer relationships when some customers switch to foreign suppliers.  In addition, 
FTAs may result in additional selling opportunities for domestic firms, by enhancing 
access to foreign customers.  The question I seek to answer from the studying supplier 
response to the FTA is this: do firms, both young and old, respond to the shock to 
preexisting supplier customer relationships, as well as the additional selling 
opportunities, by forming new relationships?  And if so, do they use trade credit? 
In Section 3.1, I present tables that detail the response of both young and old 
firms to FTA introduction.  Following this, I posit various explanations for the observed 
responses in Section 3.2, and conclude in Section 3.3. 
3.1 Response of Domestic Firms to China’s WTO Entry 
Fig 2 shows the increase in import volume in the 5 years after the introduction of 
US FTAs in the time period from 1994 to 2010.  The increase is normalized by US GDP at 
the introduction of the FTA.  The 3 largest increases are Canada, Mexico (both following 
the institution of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA in 1994), and 
 56 
China (following its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001.  I use China’s 
entry to the World Trade Organization as the shock for this paper because of two 
reasons.  First, it is a major shock (leading to the largest increase in import volume out of 
all the listed FTAs), and is likely to result in a more significant, and therefore easily 
measurable response by domestic firms.  Second, it only involves a single country.  
Hence, domestic industries which are likely to be more affected by import competition 
post FTA can be easily identified using ex ante factor abundance to measure exporter 
(China) comparative advantage.  By contrast, NAFTA involves two major trading 
partners 
 
Figure 2: Five Year Increase in Import Volume to American Market by FTA, 
(Normalized by US GDP at FTA Introduction) 
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Table 8 shows summary statistics of domestic firms’ trade credit policy, 
relationships, and profitability around FTA introduction.  I label selected industries as 
“Affected”, denoting that they are vulnerable to import competition post FTA. 
Table 8:  Domestic Firms Trade Credit Policy, Relationships and Profitability  
Table 8 shows summary statistics on Compustat firms’ trade credit policies, relationships and profitability, 
segmenting by Old firms (>= 5 years from IPO) and Young firms.  I also segment by whether a firm is 
vulnerable to import competition post FTA.  “Affected” is 1 if the firm is in an industry that falls in the top 
quartile of unskilled labor intensity after 2001. 
Panel A:  Percentage of Relationships that Persist to Next Time Period (%) 
 Affected Not Affected T-Test (Affected vs. Not) 
Old 80.4% 85.0% 4.32 
Young 83.1% 87.9% 3.93 
All 80.9% 87.8% 11.29 
T-Test (Old vs. Young) 1.58 5.73  
Panel B:  Number of Relationships (Absolute Count) 
 Affected Not Affected T-Test (Affected vs. Not) 
Old 1.87 1.36 4.39 
Young 1.95 0.83 9.25 
All 1.89 1.00 11.38 
T-Test (Old vs. Young) 0.28 21.50  
Panel C:  Doubtful Receivables Ratio (%) 
 Affected Not Affected T-Test (Affected vs. Not) 
Old 4.72% 5.37% 1.48 
Young 2.49% 5.75% 4.33 
All 4.14% 5.60% 3.83 
T-Test (Old vs. Young) 3.53 2.84  
Panel D:  Receivables Length (Days) 
 Affected Not Affected T-Test (Affected vs. Not) 
Old 35.88 43.44 3.39 
Young 34.14 47.60 3.24 
All 35.44 46.04 5.23 
T-Test (Old vs. Young) -0.42 6.22  
Panel E:  Gross Profit Margin (%) 
 Affected Not Affected T-Test (Affected vs. Not) 
Old 41.5% 97.4% 6.60 
Young 46.2% 76.3% 2.50 
All 42.7% 84.2% 6.31 
T-Test (Old vs. Young) 0.52 9.77  
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Effects of the FTA will vary by industry due to the distribution of exporter 
comparative advantage.  Domestic firms that are in industries where the exporter enjoys 
a comparative advantage will experience greater import competition.  Following 
Romalis ‘04, I use domestic industries that are intensive in unskilled labor as a measure 
of industries where importers enjoy a comparative advantage.  “Affected” in Table 8 is 
defined as industries that fall in the top quartile of unskilled labor intensity.  Using the 
definition from Romalis ‘04, unskilled labor intensity is defined as the ratio of 
production workers to total employment.  Table 12 in Appendix A lists the top 10 
unskilled labor intensive industries, as well as the top 10 skilled labor intensive 
industries using this definition (averaging across all years). 
Consistent with FTA introduction leading to more competition for domestic 
firms and disrupting existing supplier-customer relationships, Table 8 Panel A finds that 
supplier firms in affected industries are less likely to have supplier customer 
relationships persist to the next time period.  Table 8 Panel E also shows that 
profitability falls for all firms post FTA, consistent with increased competition.  Table 9 
displays results from a logit estimation of whether an existing relationship survives to 
the next time period; results are consistent with Table 8 Panel A:  firms in affected 
industries are less likely to have relationships that persist to the next period. 
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Table 9:  Logit Estimation of Relationship Persistence to the Next Period 
Table 9 estimates a logit model of whether an existing supplier-customer relationship pair persists to the 
next year at the relationship-year level.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Next Period Relationship 
Affected -0.234** 
(-1.998) 
Ln(Supplier Assets) 0.122*** 
(6.099) 
Supplier Payout Ratio 0.164 
(0.811) 
Ln(Customer Assets) 0.0691*** 
(3.526) 
Customer Payout Ratio 0.136 
(0.881) 
GDP Growth 1.819*** 
(8.047) 
Supplier Market to Book Ratio 0.00389 
(0.232) 
Customer Market to Book Ratio 0.0612*** 
(2.890) 
Supplier Advertising Expense -2.207 
(-1.611) 
Total Percentage of Sales to  Customer 0.245*** 
(2.817) 
Length of Relationship 0.0439*** 
(4.510) 
Constant -0.367 
(-0.666) 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y 
Observations 7,243 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Surprisingly, Table 8 Panel B shows that affected suppliers also end up with a 
greater number of relationships post FTA (see Section 3.2.2.1 for a discussion on this 
observation).  Table 8 Panel C shows summary statistics on the response of doubtful 
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receivables to FTA introduction.  I investigate the response of doubtful receivables 
further by estimating a difference-in-difference equation, with doubtful receivables as 
the dependent variable (see Table 10). 
Eqn 1:  Doubtful Receivablesit = C + β1Affectedit + OldFirmit + β2Affectedit× OldFirmit + 
βcontrolsControlsit + Firm Fixed Effectsi + Year Fixed Effectst + εit 
Table 10:  Difference in Difference estimation of Domestic Firm response to FTA  
Table 10 estimates doubtful receivables at the firm-year level against lifecycle stage, Affected, and 
controls (Eqn 1) using ordinary least squares.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Receivables Length -0.171*** 
  (-7.024) 
Payables Length 0.0157*** 
  (3.126) 
Post IPO -0.00615** 
  (-1.970) 
Affected -0.0250*** 
  (-2.995) 
Post IPO * Affected 0.0301*** 
  (2.708) 
Ln (Total Assets) -0.0106*** 
  (-4.336) 
Dividend 0.0213 
  (0.692) 
Tangibility 0.0487*** 
  (2.719) 
Market to Book -0.000369* 
  (-1.947) 
GDP Growth 0.00179 
  (0.592) 
Constant 0.105*** 
  (6.083) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Y 
Observations 9,907 
R-squared 0.557 
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Results in Table 10 are consistent with findings in Table 8 Panel C.  In particular, 
older firms (Post IPO) in affected industries have greater doubtful receivables compared 
to younger firms post FTA.  This is a reversal of the trends found in Ee ’13, and will be 
the focus of discussion in Section 3.2.1. 
In addition, I study the possibility that suppliers may face decreasing returns to 
scale in relationships, by estimating how the absolute growth in number of relationships 
is related to existing relationship stock; decreasing returns to scale was one of the 
potential reasons cited in Ee ’13 for older firms lacking the incentive to form new 
relationships.  This analysis is done separately from studying firm response to FTA 
introduction, and is shown in Table 11. 
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Table 11:  OLS Estimation of Absolute Growth in Number of Relationships 
Table 11 estimates via ordinary least squares the absolute growth in number of relationships (using 
principal customer data) against existing number of relationships and controls at the firm-year level.  
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
  Absolute Growth in Number of Relationships 
Number of Existing Relationships -0.715*** 
  (-46.46) 
Revenue Growth 0.0168* 
  (1.708) 
Profit Margin 0.000621* 
  (1.775) 
Ln (Total Assets) 0.00545 
  (0.251) 
Ln (Total Revenues) -0.0197 
  (-0.778) 
Market to Book Ratio 0.00665 
  (1.631) 
Constant 1.384*** 
  (12.70) 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y 
Observations 18,897 
R-squared 0.368 
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3.2 Implications of FTA Response for Supplier Trade Credit 
Policy 
In this section, I survey the response of domestic firms to FTA introduction, and 
posit explanations for these responses. 
Table 8 Panel C shows that doubtful receivables for both young and old firms are 
lower for firm-years affected by the FTA.  Overall, doubtful receivables for affected firm-
years are 4.14%, compared to 5.60% for unaffected firm-years.  There is a significant 
difference in the responses of old and young firms, with young firms experiencing a far 
more drastic decrease.  In percentage point terms, the decrease for young firms is 
around 5 times greater than old firms.  While old firms only experience a decrease in 
doubtful receivables of 0.65 percentage points, young firms witness a huge 3.26 
percentage points drop in doubtful receivables, from 5.75% to 2.49%.  The diff-in-diff 
estimation in Table 10 support this finding, with a positive significant coefficient on the 
interaction variation Post IPO*Affected.  Additionally, a robustness test of Table 10, 
using Ln (Doubtful Receivables) instead of Doubtful Receivables ratio as the dependent 
variable can be found in the Appendix. 
The general trend by both young and old firms towards lower doubtful 
receivables post FTA is consistent with higher credit standards, and therefore lower 
investment into relationship building (another possible reason is that it may be easier to 
build relationships post FTA due to a shift in average customer characteristics - see 
Section 3.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of this scenario).  Domestic firms may lower 
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investment into relationship building because of increased competition post FTA, which 
in turn lowers expected relationship duration.  Lower relationship duration is consistent 
with the higher attrition rates in Table 8 Panel A, where only 80.9% of relationships in 
any given year survive to the next year post FTA.  This compares with 87.8% pre FTA, 
and is robust to controls in the logit estimation in Table 9.  Moreover, gross profit 
margins of all affected firms fall post FTA.  Table 8 Panel E shows that overall profit 
margins for affected firms are only 42.7%, compared to 84.2% for unaffected firms.  This 
is consistent with the FTA resulting in greater competition.  Interestingly, young firms 
enjoy a marginally higher profit margin than older firms post FTA (46.2% v.s. 41.5%).  
While this difference is not robust, it is a dramatic shift from the pre FTA landscape, 
where old firms had a 97.4% gross profit margin, compared to 76.3% for young firms.  
On the profitability dimension, young firms appear to gain more from the FTA. 
3.2.1 Trade Credit Standards Post FTA by Young and Old Firms 
The finding that young firms experience a drop in doubtful receivables ratio that 
is 5 times greater than old firms is puzzling.  If one neglects customer side effects 
(discussed in 3.2.2), this implies that young firms raise their trade credit standards 
dramatically more than old firms post FTA.  Despite this, young firms also manage to 
catch up to old firms in terms of number of relationships.  Table 8 Panel B shows that 
young firms have a marginally greater number of relationships post FTA compared to 
older firms, although the difference is not robust.  However, this is a drastic difference 
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compared to before the FTA, where old firms had an average of 1.36 relationships and 
young firms an average of 0.83.  These findings are consistent with older firms being less 
efficient at relationship building post FTA.  Not only do young firms close the gap with 
old firms on number of relationships, they maintain higher credit standards while doing 
so.  One possibility is that the lower credit standards of older firms relative to their 
younger counter parts post FTA compensates for their lower efficiency (overall) in 
building new relationships.  In Section 3.2.1.1, I discuss a possible reason for this 
(technological obsolescence, etc.).  Notwithstanding, if the lower credit standards by 
older firms are indeed compensatory, this would be inconsistent with the view that 
older firms are unable to vary trade credit standards as a tool for relationship building 
purposes.   
It is also interesting that both young and old firms have roughly similar number 
of principal supplier-customer relationships post FTA (around 1.9).  Table 11 shows that 
absolute growth in number of relationships is negatively related to number of 
relationships.  This is consistent with a decreasing returns to scale regime for 
relationships, where incentive to invest in relationship building decreases with the size 
of the relationship stock.  This potentially addresses the puzzle from Ee ’13 where older 
firms have generally higher trade credit standards than younger firms.  Moreover, the 
response of older firms in having lower credit standards compared to young firms post 
 66 
FTA suggests that while they remain able to use trade credit standards to build 
relationships, they do so less efficiently than younger firms. 
3.2.1.1 Discussion 
Overall, results from Table 8 to 10 are consistent with young firms gaining more 
from an FTA than older firms.  Young firms close the gap in number of supplier-
customer relationships and profitability with old firms, while decreasing doubtful 
receivables from above the levels of old firms (pre FTA) to below the levels of old firms 
(post FTA).   
The possibility that young firms may be able to build relationships with greater 
ease than older firms post FTA was raised.  One scenario that may result in this trend is 
technology.  If younger suppliers are based on more recent technology, and older 
suppliers have difficulty migrating their technological base, then younger suppliers may 
have an advantage in forming relationships with younger customers (who may 
themselves lack supplier relationships).  Existing research suggests that older suppliers 
may be reluctant to migrate their technological base due to potential “cannibalization” 
of revenues in the short term. 
3.2.2 Alternative Explanations:  Customer Driven Scenarios 
The findings in Table 8 to 10 are also consistent with a change in the composition 
of customers for affected industries after the FTA.  Table 8 Panel B shows that 
introduction of the FTA is associated with an increase in number of relationships for 
 67 
affected firms; 1.89 supplier customer relationships for affected firms, versus an average 
of 1.00 supplier customer relationships for unaffected firms.  This suggests an expansion 
in the number of customers available to domestic suppliers post FTA.  Interestingly, 
Table 8 Panel D shows that average receivables length fell post FTA, from around 46 
days pre FTA to 35 days post FTA.  This may be the result of suppliers lowering 
receivables length to minimize nonpayment risks from new or foreign customers.  
Notwithstanding, if affected domestic suppliers are selling to foreign customers (i.e. 
customers in China) post FTA, we would expect a longer receivables period because of 
longer transportation time, unless the customers have no significant quality assurance 
concerns with respect to the suppliers. 
A change in the potential customer base may additionally result in an upward 
shift in the average credit quality of the customer pool for affected firms, and explain the 
overall drop in doubtful receivables post FTA.  This may be due to either new entrants 
(Chinese firms) having an overall higher credit quality, or because of selection.  Selection 
may occur because Chinese firms who purchase internationally from American firms 
may be larger and more well financed Chinese companies, who are better able to bear 
the additional costs of purchasing internationally (in terms of transportation and 
information acquisition costs).  A shift in credit quality would also explain the shorter 
receivables length, if customers have the capacity to pay faster.  
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3.2.2.1 Discussion 
It is surprising that firms affected by import competition post FTA manage to 
increase their number of relationships.  These are firms in industries that use unskilled 
labor intensively.  Existing research in international trade (e.g. Romalis ’04, etc) indicate 
that domestic producers should not enjoy a cost advantage in these industries.  I 
formulate various scenarios for why domestic suppliers are able to increase their 
number of relationships in the remainder of this section. 
One possibility is that domestic suppliers react to the increased level of 
competition post FTA by focusing on forming supplier-customer relationships as a 
means of mitigating competition.  Suppliers may have an incentive to do this if supplier-
customer relationships involve some degree of customer lock in, and therefore, 
insulation from competition.  In addition, the lower profit margin in Table 8 Panel E 
may point to supplier concessions to entice customers to enter into the relationship.  
Interestingly, young suppliers remain favored by customers compared to older 
suppliers. 
A second possibility is that domestic producers may be able to benefit from low 
cost foreign firms in the same industry by partnering with them.  While domestic firms 
may benefit from the lower production costs from their foreign partner, the foreign 
partner may also benefit from the domestic producer’s access to the American market, 
and also domestic producers’ more established reputation in the American market.  
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Table 12 in the appendix lists industries that are affected by import competition post 
FTA.  Many of the manufacturing industries listed may involve both the manufacture of 
components, as well as final assembly (e.g. vehicle and automobile manufacturing).  
Domestic and foreign partners may specialize in different parts of the production chain.  
The overall lower product cost could lead to domestic producers establishing additional 
customer relationships.   
3.2.3 Distinguishing between Supplier and Customer Driven 
Explanations 
In this section, I discuss avenues for future research to distinguish between 
supplier and customer driven explanations for the overall drop in doubtful receivables 
post FTA.  Supplier driven explanations (section 3.2.1) point to the drop in doubtful 
receivables as a result of higher supplier credit standards.  In turn, this results from a 
reluctance to invest in relationship building because of shorter expected relationship 
durations.  On the other hand, customer driven explanations (section 3.2.2) point to the 
drop as a consequence of an upward shift in the average credit quality of customers. 
One way to distinguish between supplier and customer driven effects is to 
answer the following two questions:  first, has the pool of potential customers changed?  
Second, has the average credit quality of the pool of potential customers changed, and in 
which direction? 
The overall increase in relationship count by affected firms post FTA (Table 8 
Panel B) is consistent with an expansion in the pool of potential customers.  
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Nevertheless, an alternative scenario cited in Section 3.2.2.1 is that suppliers emphasize 
relationship formation post FTA to mitigate increased competition.  Because of this, 
Table 8 Panel B is insufficient to conclusively establish that the pool of potential 
customers is now larger.   
If the pool of potential customers has expanded post FTA, the new customers are 
likely to be Chinese firms.  This prediction can be verified directly using data from the 
Compustat Business Information file, which discloses the names of both supplier as well 
as principal customers.  While supplier Compustat gvkey is disclosed, the only identifier 
for the customer is firm name.  Nonetheless, using these names, a manual match to the 
country of origin for the customer can be implemented based on string / keyword 
matching to either a database of Chinese firms, or internet searches1.  If the “new 
relationships” that domestic suppliers acquire post FTA are predominantly with 
Chinese customers, this supports the hypothesis that the pool of potential customers has 
expanded.   
Before addressing credit quality, I note that in this scenario, it will be interesting 
to investigate the nature of the American-Chinese firm relationships.  In particular, it 
will be surprising (if verified empirically) that American suppliers in affected industries 
are able to form supplier relationships with Chinese customers.  Comparative advantage 
                                                     
1 In theory, the Compustat Business Information File discloses customer country of origin as well as region.  
However, the variable is missing for most observations, and is likely not usable in practice.  Out of 54,417 
supplier-customer observations in my dataset, customer country of origin was only available for 787 
observations. 
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predicts quite the opposite.  Conjectures that address this puzzle were discussed in 
Section 3.2.2.1; potential data sources for information about the new relationships 
include the MD&A sections of American suppliers 10 Qs/Ks. 
On average credit quality of the customer pool post FTA, this is more 
challenging to estimate given the difficulty in translating firm specific data on Chinese 
customers.  Even if this data were easily accessible, endogeneity of customer credit 
quality and supplier trade credit policy is a significant concern.  In particular, Chinese 
customers facing American suppliers with generous financing policies could develop 
better credit quality as a direct consequence.  One way to address this concern is to 
predict the average credit quality of Chinese customers based on instruments that are 
reasonably exogenous to American trade financing.  For instance, Chinese 
macroeconomic variables and governmental fiscal and monetary policy shifts.  The 
average credit quality of Chinese customers can predicted in a first stage estimation 
using these variables, and predicted credit quality used in the second stage to estimate 
doubtful receivables of domestic suppliers while controlling for new customer credit 
quality.  This methodology also sidesteps the difficulty in obtaining Chinese firm 
specific data; macroeconomic variables will be far easier to obtain.  
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3.3 Conclusions and Future Work 
Domestic firms that are affected by import competition post- FTA have lower 
doubtful receivables post FTA.  However, the drop in doubtful receivables for younger 
firms is 5 times greater than for older firms.  Both young and old affected firms also have 
a larger number of relationships post FTA, on average.  This suggests an expanded pool 
of potential customers.  Additionally, profitability falls for all domestic firms, consistent 
with additional competition resulting from the FTA.  Independently from the FTA, I also 
find evidence consistent with decreasing returns to scale in relationships. 
The overall decrease in doubtful receivables is consistent with either an upward 
shift in supplier credit standards, or an increase in average customer credit quality; in 
both scenarios, young firms gain more from the FTA compared to older firms.  If one 
adopts the supply side scenario, this implies that young firms increase their relationship 
stock by more than older firms, while maintaining higher credit standards.  Conversely, 
if the shift in doubtful receivables is driven by customer characteristics, this suggests 
that higher credit quality customers prefer younger suppliers to older suppliers, 
resulting in younger suppliers ending up with lower doubtful receivables than older 
suppliers.   
Overall, my findings are consistent with two points:  first, older suppliers have a 
lowered incentive to engage in relationship formation, due to decreasing returns to 
scale.  Second, older suppliers have a reduced capacity to engage in relationship 
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formation, as suggested by young firms gaining more from the FTA compared to older 
firms (although my results remain agnostic on whether this is driven primarily by 
supplier or customer preferences) 
The reasons for younger firms’ advantage in relationship formation over older 
firms may represent an interesting avenue for future work.  One possibility discussed is 
technology.  If younger suppliers are based on more recent technology, and older 
suppliers have difficulty migrating their technological base, then younger suppliers may 
have an advantage in forming relationships with younger customers (who may 
themselves lack supplier relationships). 
Another open question is why domestic firms in affected industries are able to 
expand their relationship base post FTA, while competing with foreign suppliers who 
possess cost advantages, in theory.  Possible explanations that were discussed include 
suppliers using relationships to mitigate competition, and also suppliers benefiting from 
low cost foreign producers via partnership. 
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Appendix  
Table 12: Top 10 Unskilled and Skilled Labor Intensive Industries (average 
across all years) 
Top 10 Unskilled Labor Intensive Industries   
NAICS Unskilled Labor Intensity Industry Name 
336112 0.89 Light Truck and Utility Vehicle Manufacturing 
311615 0.88 Poultry Processing 
327213 0.88 Glass Container Manufacturing 
335224 0.88 Household Laundry Equipment Manufacturing 
313210 0.87 Broadwoven Fabric Mills 
311313 0.87 Beet Sugar Manufacturing 
336111 0.85 Automobile Manufacturing 
326160 0.84 Plastics Bottle Manufacturing 
311513 0.83 Cheese Manufacturing 
311230 0.83 Breakfast Cereal Manufacturing 
Top 10 Skilled Labor Intensive Industries 
NAICS Skilled Labor Intensity Industry Name 
334111 0.72 Electronic Computer Manufacturing 
336419 0.70 Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Parts 
334511 0.69 
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, 
Aeronautical and  
Nautical Systems and Instrument Manufacturing 
334119 0.68 Other Computer Peripheral Equipment 
334210 0.67 Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing 
336414 0.67 Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Manufacturing 
334516 0.67 Analytical Laboratory Instrument Manufacturing 
334517 0.65 Irradiation Apparatus Manufacturing 
325413 0.65 In-Vitro Diagnostic Substance Manufacturing 
334515 0.65 
Instrument Manufacturing for Measuring and  
Testing Electricity and Electrical Signals 
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Table 13:  Robustness Test of SUR Estimation in Chapter 2, using Ln 
(Doubtful Receivables), excluding suppliers facing high HHI Customer Industries 
Table 13 reruns the estimation in column (2) of Tables 3 & 4, Chapter 1, replacing Doubtful 
Receivables with Ln(Doubtful Receivables).  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (i) (ii) 
 Dependent Variable Ln (Doubtful Receivables) Receivables Length 
Receivables Length -0.101***   
  (-15.81)   
Ln (Doubtful Receivables)   -0.217*** 
    (-16.51) 
Pre IPO -0.0109*** -0.00599 
  (-3.020) (-0.937) 
IPO -0.00349 -0.00337 
  (-1.061) (-0.626) 
Relationship Industry -0.000156 0.00820*** 
  (-0.0862) (3.163) 
Relationship Industry * Pre IPO 0.00247 0.00820 
  (0.691) (1.252) 
Relationship Industry * IPO 0.00614* 0.00451 
  (1.893) (0.864) 
Ln (Research) 0.00122*** -0.000551 
  (3.004) (-0.546) 
Ln (Research) * Pre IPO -0.000761 0.00309* 
  (-0.780) (1.743) 
Ln (Research) * IPO 7.61e-05 0.000573 
  (0.121) (0.582) 
Payout Ratio 0.0335*** 0.0317 
  (3.198) (1.606) 
Profitability -0.00207*** -0.00612*** 
  (-9.736) (-11.20) 
Fraction Government Sales -0.0198*** 0.00984** 
  (-5.460) (2.370) 
Payables Length 0.0157*** 0.0604*** 
  (10.57) (11.94) 
GDP Growth -0.00103 0.00667*** 
  (-1.183) (3.998) 
Ln (Total Assets) -0.00556*** 0.00212*** 
  (-15.41) (2.590) 
Constant 0.0903*** 0.0961*** 
  (5.323) (7.675) 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Observations 71,319 71,319 
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Table 14:  Robustness Test of Diff-in-Diff Estimation in Chapter 3, using Ln 
(Doubtful Receivables) 
Table 14 reruns the estimation in Table 10 of Chapter 3, replacing Doubtful Receivables with 
Ln(Doubtful Receivables).  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
  Ln (Doubtful Receivables) 
Receivables Length -0.145*** 
  (-7.178) 
Payables Length 0.0131*** 
  (3.207) 
Post IPO -0.00502* 
  (-1.897) 
Affected -0.0213*** 
  (-3.044) 
Post IPO * Affected 0.0257*** 
  (2.824) 
Ln (Total Assets) -0.00861*** 
  (-4.236) 
Payout Ratio 0.0184 
  (0.713) 
Tangibility 0.0433*** 
  (2.897) 
Market to Book Ratio -0.000325** 
  (-2.059) 
GDP Growth 0.00190 
  (0.752) 
Constant 0.0887*** 
  (6.200) 
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Y 
Observations 9,907 
R-squared 0.567 
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